Tony Bingham’s argument here is a clear, scathing critique of the Design and Build (D&B) contract model and the Grenfell inquiry’s findings expose it vividly. Bingham makes a case that builders—especially subcontractors and what he calls "putter-uppers"—should not be burdened with design responsibilities they aren’t trained for. The heart of his point? Builders build; designers design.
The Grenfell report, specifically Volume 4, Part 6, breaks down the cascade of failures from architects to subcontractors, highlighting how performance obligations were misplaced in the hands of builders ill-equipped for design. Contractors and subcontractors may handle “installation” like pros, but when asked to design, interpret regulations, or ensure safety standards, many stumble. Grenfell’s inquiry committee reportedly found the main contractor shockingly casual in addressing fire safety and regulatory obligations. They labeled the contractor’s approach as “incompetent,” from managing the design to understanding fire safety regulations, particularly Document B (approved guidance for fire safety).
Bingham’s message is blunt: the design responsibilities should be left to the professionals who carry relevant qualifications. In his view, the Design and Build model’s failure lies in placing design and safety expectations on contractors who are, fundamentally, experts in assembly—not architecture or engineering.
The Fundamental Argument: Builders are Builders, Not Designers
Bingham’s issue with D&B contracts is that they effectively force contractors to take on a “leader of the orchestra” role—outsourcing, coordinating, and even designing aspects of construction they’re not equipped to handle. Subcontractors in many cases begin “on the tools,” with hands-on, practical knowledge. But as they grow and are asked to handle both “design and install,” they find themselves navigating waters meant for qualified professionals.
As for his call to action, Bingham doesn’t just say it’s a mistake; he urges the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) to ban D&B contracts entirely in honor of the 72 lives lost in the Grenfell fire. He suggests scrapping the Design and Build model in favor of contracts that make a clear division between design and assembly.
Who Should Design? The Qualified, Not the Qualified-by-Experience
His critique extends to the broader industry practice of placing design obligations onto subcontractors. Without professional design qualifications, subcontractors are unprepared to shoulder full responsibility for safety and specifications, leading to tragic oversights. A return to the “nominated subcontractor” model might be better, where designers liaise with experienced builders without asking them to make design-based decisions. This would, Bingham argues, allow everyone to stick to what they know best.
In sum, Bingham paints a harsh but clear picture: the D&B model, as applied, diffuses responsibility so much that it’s become a “cover” for companies to offload safety and design responsibilities, often with catastrophic results. Grenfell's tragic lesson, in his eyes, is simple—let the professionals design, and let the builders build.
